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ABSTRACT
An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) to secure computer networks
reports indicators for an attack as alerts. However, every attack can
result in a multitude of IDS alerts that need to be correlated to see
the full picture of the attack. In this paper, we present a correlation
approach that transforms clusters of alerts into a graph structure
on which we compute signatures of network motifs to characterize
these clusters. A motif representation of attack characteristics is
magnitudes smaller than the original alert data, but still allows to
efficiently compare and correlate attacks with each other and with
reference signatures. This allows not only to identify known attack
scenarios, e.g., DDoS, scan, and worm attacks, but also to derive new
reference signatures for unknown scenarios. Our results indicate a
reliable identification of scenarios, even when attacks differ in size
and at least slightly in their characteristics. Applied on real-world
alert data, our approach can classify and assign attack scenarios
of up to 96% of all attacks and can represent their characteristics
using 1% of the size of the full alert data.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→ Intrusion detection systems; • Net-
works→ Network security; •Computingmethodologies→ Un-
supervised learning.
KEYWORDS
intrusion detection, attacks, alert correlation, network motifs
1 INTRODUCTION
In our interconnected society, attacks on IT systems can have sig-
nificant impact. A common security practice is to deploy a network-
based Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) and/or a host monitoring
and host IDS. Such IDS will output alerts when they detect security
incidents. Subsequently, alert correlation can be leveraged to find
relations among all alerts and to cluster them to attacks, e.g., based
on alert similarity [18]. In recent years, the increasing network
traffic challenges network-based intrusion detection with the data
volume that needs to be analyzed. Because of that, scalable Col-
laborative IDSs (CIDS) [15] emerged. They deploy multiple IDS
sensors in the network and collaboratively analyze traffic on the
level of alert detection [3] or alert correlation [2, 4, 16]. For that,
IDS sensors either communicate with a central alert correlation
unit or directly with each other.
Despite the benefits of larger visibility and load distribution
that come with CIDSs, they introduces new challenges to the alert
correlation process as individual sensors now need to exchange
high-volume data in the form of alerts. A pairwise comparison
and correlation of all attacks and their alerts via a CIDS induces
a high computation and communication overhead. For example,
in a centralized CIDS, every sensor will share every single alert
with the central alert correlation unit. To avoid this, an efficient
and compact abstraction for attacks is required that can be pre-
computed by every sensor, shared efficiently, and that still allows
for an efficient analysis of attacks and their interconnections. To
achieve this, the attack abstraction needs to be significantly smaller
than the original alert sets. Correlating attacks on the basis of their
smaller abstractions, consumes significant less resources and there-
fore allows for faster and more efficient correlation algorithms.
Thus, a CIDS benefits from a small abstraction through less data
that needs to be exchanged between individual sensors or in be-
tween sensors and a central alert correlation unit. However, such
a reduction in size should preserve characteristic information on
the attack. Hence, these abstractions of alert sets should represent
some kind of fingerprints that can be compared with each other,
e.g., for similarity.
Most algorithms correlate attacks with respect to common at-
tackers, i.e., on the basis of common IP addresses [4, 9, 17]. However,
a more generic approach is required that subsumes specific correla-
tion algorithms and can be applied to a decentralized CIDS setting.
For that, correlating according to the same attack scenario might be
equally important. An attack scenario is a class of attacks that all
show a characteristic communication pattern among the involved
hosts. The communication structure of a DDoS attack is different
from a worm spreading and both differ from the lateral movement
of an attacker in a network.
The main contribution of this paper is a novel attack correlation
algorithm that uses abstractions of attacks based on network mo-
tifs to identify attack scenarios. For that, we transform all alerts
belonging to an attack into a graph representation from which we
derive motif signatures. Motifs are characteristic subgraphs and a
motif signature summarizes the occurrence of different types of
motifs in a graph. It thus can serve as a fingerprint for the respec-
tive attack and does neither include IP addresses nor ports. This
allows not only for a more compact attack representation, it is also
more privacy-preserving as attack patterns can be shared without
revealing identities of involved systems and services. That can help
to reduce the load in a CIDS, as IDS sensors exchange motif signa-
tures first and only when signatures match, i.e., they experience
similar attacks, they would exchange more detailed information,
e.g., complete alert clusters. Our results indicate that we can corre-
late attacks from the same attack scenario with high accuracy and
that our approach can also operate in a completely unsupervised
setting to detect unknown attack scenarios. We apply our approach
on real-world data and can represent the motif characteristics of
attacks at 1 % of the size of the full data and can classify and assign
attack scenarios to up to 96 % of all attacks.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2
we present related work. Section 3 describes our approach that
incorporates motifs into an attack correlation algorithm for the
identification of known attack scenarios and for learning new attack
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scenarios. The performance is evaluated in Section 4 and Section 5
concludes our work.
2 RELATEDWORK
We present related work with respect to three areas. First, we look
at alert correlation algorithms that cluster alerts to attacks and
then classify these attacks based on predefined scenarios. Second,
we look at approaches to data sharing in Collaborative Intrusion
Detection Systems (CIDS). Last, we look at how network motifs
have been previously used in the context of network security.
Attack Scenarios. There are many alert correlation algorithms
that extract the predominant information from a set of alerts, where
each alert consists of attributes such as source and destination IP
and port. The intention is to find groups of alerts within the larger
set of alerts that share a common pattern and thus are likely to be-
long to the same underlying attack. These patterns usually consists
of multiple pairs of attributes and their corresponding values which
are equal for all alerts in the same cluster. Zhou et al. [17] describe
how to reduce a large alert set to attribute patterns by using a
lattice structure. Furthermore, they identified eight special types
of patterns and assign them a so-called attack type. For example,
a pattern with fixed source IP and port and fixed destination port
is a distributed reflector DoS. Instead of finding attribute patterns
among the alerts, Haas et al. [4] propose community clustering
on an alert graph. The authors then assign each resulting attack
cluster one of four scenarios that are differentiated by the number
of attackers and victims respectively. Zhu et al. [19] automatically
construct attack scenarios from alert data by modeling causal re-
lationship of two alerts in neural networks. Jero et al. [6] present
a more specific approach to scenario detection. They leverage a
state machine model of TCP congestion control to automatically
generate abstract attack strategies.
Data Sharing in CIDS. In CIDS, sensors are distributed in the
network [15]. They perform intrusion detection locally [11] but
exchange (parts of) their detection results. A low volume data ex-
change is usually desired for efficiency. Cai et al. [2] propose a
DHT-based overlay that is used by the sensors for detecting worms.
For that, sensors generate signatures about suspicious packets lo-
cally and share them amongst each other. A worm is detected if the
signature is observed by a sufficient amount of sensors in the CIDS.
Domino [16] is an overlay system with multiple layers that was
designed for the monitoring of Internet outbreaks. The so-called
axis nodes are organized in a DHT-based overlay and form the back-
bone of the system. Satellite nodes form communities and report
their alert data to axis nodes to share their aggregation in the axis
overlay. These summaries describe attack data and are based on
ports, sources, or alert clusters. Julisch [7] presents an alert correla-
tion approach based on attribute-oriented induction that aggregates
attributes in an alert set to report attribute patterns similar to Zhou
et al. [17]. The resulting pattern with their corresponding values is
an compression of the alert set itself. Locasto et al. [9] propose a
privacy-preserving compression of alert data for sharing suspicious
IP addresses. They are inserted into a bloom filter, a bitmap that
basically allows insertion and lookup operations of hashed input.
This prevents anyone from retrieving the raw IP addresses but al-
lows for lookups of a specific IP address. A compression in size is
also achieved because multiple IPs can be inserted into the bloom
filter that is of fixed size.
Network Motifs for Network Security. A directed graphG = (V ,E)
with its vertices V and edges E ⊆ V ×V can be characterized by
network motifs [10]. They express how the verticesV are connected
among each other in G. For that, we look at individual sub-graphs
G ′ = (V ′,E ′)′ ⊆ G that consist of a fixed number n of vertices,
i.e., |V ′ | = n nodes from V and out of edges E ′ ⊆ E. The idea of
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Figure 1: All 16 possible patterns for subgraphs of 3-motifs
motifs is based on the finite number of edges that can at most exist
among any n nodes, which is limited by n · (n − 1) in case of a
directed graph. This further means that 2n ·(n−1) different graphs
can be generated with n nodes. Motifs in fact describe isomorphic
classes for these possible graphs. Thus, a motif expresses a specific
pattern how n nodes could be interconnected. For example, for
subgraphs of size n = 3, N = 16 distinct motif patterns exists,
which are identified by their motif index mi with i ∈ [0,N − 1].
Figure 1 shows all possible motifs for n = 3, wherem0 represents
n nodes without any edges and all n · (n − 1) directed edges exist
for mN−1. Thus, we can map any subgraph G ′ to a motif index
mi . When we do this for all subgraphs G ′ ⊆ G in our graph G
and count the occurences of everymi , the result is called a motif-
signature. Such a signature describes how often a specific motive
is present in graph G. With respect to network security, Allan et
al. [1] are identifying application types in network traffic. With the
help of motifs, they analyze the communication graph to predict
the application. Juszczyszyn et al. [8] show that motifs can be used
to detect statistical anomalies in the communication graph during
an attack in the network.
However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no related work
that uses motifs in intrusion detection to identify attack scenarios.
GAC [4] can only identify four pre-defined cluster classes (oto, otm,
mto, mtm). OurMotif-approach can characterize attacks generically,
predefined, dynamically, and way more fine-grained. Compared to
[8], our data basis is on alert data and we use a novel graph model
for representing communication relationships (preserving different
usage behaviour of ports). The authors of [8] have only shown that
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attacks can change the motifs in NetFlows graphs. In contrast, we
(1) design a system that allows to compare attack characteristics, (2)
evaluate the ability to differentiate between different attacks, and
(3) create attack signatures that can be shared to identify similar
attacks.
3 CHARACTERISTICS OF ATTACK
SCENARIOS
With the increasing amount of attacks on computer networks and
IT systems, there is a need to efficiently categorize, filter and cor-
relate alerts to understand the root cause of an attack and to be
able to choose appropriate countermeasures for its mitigation. We
present an approach based on network motifs [10] that provides
abstractions of attacks, i.e., of their alert data. Our motif abstraction
is a fixed size characteristic fingerprint of an attack. Thus, it can
be magnitudes smaller than the corresponding alert data and al-
lows for a faster comparison of attacks. With the help of this motif
abstraction, our approach identifies attack scenarios and is even
able to learn previously unknown scenarios. It can be deployed in
a centralized or decentralized manner.
The goal is to inspect attacks in a way that differs from most
algorithms that search for common attributes among the alerts
from different attacks. These approaches can reveal if two victims
are targeted by the same attacker but they cannot tell if the attacker
performs the same kind of attack in both cases. That is why our
approach identifies and compares attacks regarding their attack
scenario, which basically describes how attackers and victims in-
teract. If an attack is not only involving a single attacker and a
single victim, the questions arises who of the involved hosts at-
tacks whom. The answer can be simple for a Distributed Denial of
Service (DDoS), where all attackers target one victim. But how to
differentiate between a worm spreading and a coordinated scan,
where each of the attackers scans a subset of victims?
In the next Section 3.1, we describe the principles behind the
classification of attack scenarios by calculating the similarities be-
tween motif signatures on the alert data of attacks. Afterwards in
Section 3.2, we describe how to utilize the comparison of motif
signatures to classify known and unknown attack scenarios.
3.1 Comparing Characteristics of Attacks
The basic idea of our correlation algorithm is to transform a set of
alerts into a much smaller representation that conserves structural
characteristics of attacks. We found network motifs, specifically the
so-called motif signatures (cf. Section 2), to be a perfect candidate
to summarize the communication structure of the hosts involved
in an attack. This allows for an easy comparison of the structural
characteristics of attacks, even without prior knowledge of these
characteristics and mostly independent from the attack size.
Please note that we present a correlation on attack level, which
requires the alert data to be clustered in the preferred way of choice,
e.g. [4, 7], to extract clusters of alerts. This is also the first step
according to the schematic overview of the approach in Figure 2.
In the following we describe the next steps in detail, which is the
transformation of attack data into graphs, the calculation of motifs
signatures, and their comparison.
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Figure 2: Schema to compare the alerts of two attacks by
their motif signatures
3.1.1 Transformation to Graph. We assume attack characteristics
to be based on the communication structure among hosts. This
structure is derived from all alerts ai ∈ A, where an alert ai has
several attributes. For our purpose, we define an alert ai = (S :T →
D:L) with source IP S and source port T and with destination IP D
and destination port L. Based on these four attributes of alerts, we
generate a Communication Structure GraphGcom for all alerts of an
attack A. In Gcom = (V ,E), nodes v ∈ V represent either a host by
its IP address or the port on a specific host. The edges reflect who
attacked whom and whether a single port is relevant in the attack.
To build the graph Gcom for a specific attack A, all alerts ai ∈ A
are added to it consecutively. For that, the set of nodesV is extended
by nodes representing the hosts, i.e., {S,T }, and nodes representing
their ports, i.e., {S :T ,D:L}. This notation ensures that ports are
always bound to hosts. To reflect who attacked whom, the edges
{(S, S :T ), (S :T ,D:L), (D:E,D)} are added to E in Gcom . Intuitively,
this describes what is visualized in Figure 3, the port and IP used to
attack another IP on a respective port.
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Figure 3: Adding an alert (S :T → D:L) to graph Gcom
3.1.2 Calculation of Signature. The last step to get from an alert set
A via the graphGcom to its small abstraction is to calculate themotif
signature of the graph (cf. Section 2). For that, we enumerate all
subgraphsG ′ = (V ′,E ′) ⊆ Gcom of size |V ′ | = n and assign them to
a specific motif patternmi with i ∈ [0,N −1]. Counting the number
of occurrences for all motifsmi results in a motif signature MA,
which is a vector containing the absolute number of occurrences
of everymi . AsMA is directly dependent on the graph size |Gcom |,
it does not allow to compare the structure of two graphs that are
of different sizes.
To enable this comparison, the authors in [10] present the so-
called Z-Score. It uses the signatureMA of graphGcom to calculate
for everymi how much it is over- or underrepresented compared
to a random graph of the same size and with the same number
of edges as Gcom . The Z-Score of a specific motif mi in a graph
G is calculated by Z (mi ) = M
A(i)−Mrand (i)
sd with M
A(i) being the
absolute number of motifmi in Gcom ,Mrand (i) being the average
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absolute count of motifmi in respective random graphs, and its
standard deviation sd . This is done for every absolute number of
motifs inMA. We denote the resulting motif signature with the Z-
Score values asMZ . Any motif signature can simply be represented
as an array of fixed length, e.g., 16 for 3-motifs.
3.1.3 Comparison of Signatures. When comparing two motif sig-
natures MZ1 and M
Z
2 , we want to calculate how similar they are.
Their similarity should be 1, i.e., 100%, if the signatures are equal.
However, finding a metric to calculate the similarity in a meaning-
ful manner is not intuitive. The reason is because even the values
in the Z-Score signature MZ are not limited to a fixed range. As
the graph size, i.e. attack size, still has an impact on the Z-Score
values, we cannot directly compare the values of every motif in two
signaturesMZ1 andM
Z
2 . Doing so would not achieve high similarity
for attacks with similar characteristics but of different size. We have
to design the comparison between two motif signatures in such
a way that similar attack characteristics are identified even if the
attacks are of different sizes. For that, a motif that is statistically
over- or underrepresented inMZ1 should also be statistically over-
or underrepresented inMZ2 . Furthermore, we make the comparison
to consider how much a specific motif is over- or underrepresented
compared to the other motifs in the signature. The idea is to not
have a pairwise comparison of the motif values in MZ1 and M
Z
2 .
Instead, the similarity between MZ1 and M
Z
2 reflects how similar
the relations among the motif values in MZ1 are to the relations
among the motif values inMZ2 .
For such a comparison, the Z-Score signaturesMZ1 andM
Z
2 are
interpreted as vectors ®u, ®v , always of fixed length. This means, we
can think of a signature as a vector in a multi-dimensional space
with the number of dimensions equal to the length of the vectors.
The higher the values in a signature, the larger is the vector in
the multi-dimensional space. To be independent from the vector
length, we calculate the angle between two vectors in the multi-
dimensional space. For that, we use the inner product < ®u, ®v >
and the Euclidean norms | | ®u | |2 and | | ®v | |2 for the calculation of the
angle ϕ (Equation 1). This finally leads to the similarity 0 ≤ sim ≤ 1
(Equation 2).
cos(ϕ) = < ®u, ®v >| | ®u | |2 · | | ®v | |2 (1)
sim =
cos−1(ϕ)
π
(2)
When we compare the Z-Score signaturesMZ to classify attack
scenarios, we define a threshold τ for their minimum similarity.
Above this threshold, two signatures belong to the same attack
scenario. Next, Section 3.2 makes use of this threshold when testing
if an attack matches a given attack scenario or when clustering
attacks for unknown attack scenarios.
3.2 Classification of Attacks
Once the alerts of every attack are transformed into motif signa-
tures MZ , the motif signatures of the different attacks, i.e., alert
sets, are compared. The goal is to find attacks with the same char-
acteristics. Such a comparison can be calculated extremely fast as a
motif signature is of a fixed and far smaller size than the respective
alert sets. For the attack correlation algorithm, predefined charac-
teristics of attacks can be used to identify specific attack scenarios
and to label them accordingly. Alternatively, the attack correlation
operates without a knowledge database and learns attack scenar-
ios on its own. It labels attacks according to dynamically derived
characteristics of alert sets. Both approaches are described in the
following.
3.2.1 Signature-based Classification. To identify scenarios in alert
sets, we first need definitions for the characteristics of already
known attack scenarios that we name reference scenarios Ri ∈ R.
Thus, a reference scenarios Ri reflects the characteristics of a spe-
cific attack scenario and therefore is representative for all attacks
of this attack scenario and their alert sets, respectively. In fact, Ri is
just the motif signatureMZ of a typical attack in the attack scenario
that should be identified. It is modeled by transforming a repre-
sentative alert set A into a Communication Structure Graph Gcom
and by computing its motif signatureMZ . Hence, set R consists of
small motif signatures. The size of this set equals the number of
predefined attack scenarios that should be identified.
When classifying an attackA, its motif signatureMZ is compared
to all reference signatures Ri ∈ R using the similarity function de-
scribed in Section 3.1.3. In general, the highest similarity determines
the attack scenario that is assigned to attack A. However, the mini-
mum similarity threshold τ needs to be respected, because there
could be attacks from unknown scenarios that are not included in
R. Hence, they should not be labeled with a known attack scenario.
When assigning all attacks to the reference scenarios, it results in
attack clusters Cx ∈ C, at most one per reference scenario. The
requirement for attacks of the same scenario MZi ∈ Cx to have a
minimum similarity τ to the respective reference scenario Rx is
formalized in Equation 3. The requirement of closest match among
all reference scenarios R is formalized in Equation 4.
∀Mi ∈ Cx : sim(Mi ,Rx ) ≥ τ (3)
∀Mi ∈ Cx : ∀Rj ∈ R : sim(Mi ,Rx ) ≥ sim(Mi ,Rj ) (4)
3.2.2 Unsupervised Clustering. Apart from using motif signatures
to identify predefined attack scenarios, we explain how motifs can
be used to cluster similar attacks and to dynamically derive refer-
ence scenarios R for them. In the following, we describe the process
of learning new attack scenarios via a hierarchical clustering in two
steps. This only highlights the capabilities of motifs for applications
in intrusion detection. The fundamentals presented here should be
easily adaptable to more sophisticated detection algorithms, e.g. for
anomaly detection or collaborative intrusion detection.
Hierarchical Clustering. To learn attack scenarios, we first cluster
attacks in a way such that all attacks from the same attack scenario
belong to one group. For that, we cluster attacks based on the simi-
larity of their motif signaturesMZ . We designed the comparison of
motif signaturesMZ to aim for high similarities among signatures
for attacks of the same scenario and low similarities of signatures
for attacks from different scenarios. The intention is that clustering
the motif signatures of attacks results in attack clusters, one for
each detected attack scenario. We find hierarchical clustering best
to cluster attacks into attack scenarios for two reasons. First, we
can use the similarity threshold τ (c.f. Section 3.1.3) as clustering
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parameter to intuitively control the clustering and its outcome.
And second, the visualization as dendrogram allows an human
inspection of the potential clusters depending on τ .
Figure 4: Hierarchical clustering for attacks from six exam-
ple scenarios
We use τ as clustering parameter in hierarchical clustering to
control the minimum similarity, i.e., maximum distance, for two
attacks, so that they are still part of the same attack scenario. Thus,
τ must be chosen in a way such that (1) it is low enough to allow
attacks of the same scenario to result in one cluster and (2) it is
high enough that two attacks of different scenarios do not result in
the same cluster. An example for hierarchical clustering of attacks
is visualized as dendrogram in Figure 4. The x-axis of the figure
represents the individual attacks and the y-axis represents 1 − τ
as maximum distance for two attacks or scenarios to be merged
into the same scenario. Hence, at distance 0, only equal attacks will
be merged and at distance 1, all attacks are merged into a single
scenario. When stepping from 0 to 1, similar attacks or scenarios
are merged once the value on the y-axis reaches their respective
distance. The idea in hierarchical clustering is to define a cut-off
distance, which determines the final clusters. The outcome are the
clusters, i.e. scenarios, that all the attacks have been merged into at
the specific cut-off distance in the dendrogram.
We use the cut-off distance 1 − τ to form clusters Cx ∈ C of
attacksMZi ∈ Cx with the desired maximum heterogeneity within
a cluster. The hierarchical clustering of MZ for the set of attacks
merges clusters with respect to the maximum distance within the
resulting cluster, which is known as the complete method [13].
This means that attack scenarios are defined by the maximum
distance between contained attacks, which can be formally stated
as in Equation 5.
∀Cx ∈ C : ∀M1,M2 ∈ Cx : sim(M1,M2) ≥ τ (5)
Deriving Reference Scenarios. The attacks in a cluster Cx ∈ C
formed by hierarchical clustering are supposed to belong to the
same attack scenario because of their similar characteristics. To
actually extract the characteristics for each attack cluster, a motif
signature MZ is derived per cluster as reference scenario Ri ∈ R
to represent the new attack scenario. Instead of constructing a
signature ourselves, we pick the signature of the attack that is most
typical for the cluster. We define the most typical attack of a cluster
to have the highest similarity with every other attack on average.
This is formalized in Equation 6.
∀Mi ∈ Cx :
|Cx |∑
j=0
sim(Mi ,Mj ) ≤
|Cx |∑
j=0
sim(Ri ,Mj ) (6)
After these two steps, a set of attacks, i.e., a set of alert sets, is
represented by a number of reference scenarios that is controlled
by the similarity threshold τ .
4 EVALUATION
For evaluating our correlation algorithm (cf. Section 3), we imple-
mented it in Python. The implementation encompasses the graph
generation, motif calculation and comparison as well as the identifi-
cation of known attack scenarios (cf. Section 3.2.1) and the detection
of unknown scenarios (cf. Section 3.2.2). Prior to the description of
the experiments and their results, we introduce the alert datasets
used for the experiments in Section 4.1.
The experiments are divided into two parts. First, Section 4.2
evaluates the applicability of motif signatures to identify and com-
pare different attack scenarios. By simulating attacks, we show
that our correlation algorithm can correctly classify attack scenar-
ios, mostly independent from the attack sizes. The second part in
Section 4.3 then evaluates our correlation algorithm on real-world
data.
4.1 Attack Data
Although our correlation algorithm operates on alerts, it is impor-
tant to notice that the algorithm works with abstractions of attacks.
Hence, the input to our correlation algorithm are alerts of specific
attacks, i.e., clusters of alerts that each represents an individual
attack. For clustering alerts to attacks, we refer to other algorithms,
e.g., [4, 7, 12, 14, 19]. In the experiments we use two different types
of alert data:
• Synthetic alerts of attacks with ground-truth and control
over to carefully evaluating the classification accuracy of our
approach. We further use this method of alert generation for
the construction of reference scenarios (cf. Section 3.2.1).
• Real-world alerts from DShield1.
Next, we explain how to generate instances of attack scenarios with
the help of synthetic alerts. Afterwards, we introduce the DShield
data set as a source for real-world alerts.
4.1.1 Instances of Attack Scenarios. To create synthetic attack data,
we generate alerts for a specific attack scenario. In our experiments
we use six different scenarios, each of them defining a pattern for
the data generation. An instance of an attack is determined by its
attack pattern and its attack size. The values for IP and ports are
randomly chosen from the full IP and port range, respectively.
Attack Patterns. For our experiments, we describe the alert pat-
terns for six attack scenarios. We use these patterns for two pur-
poses: 1) For generating synthetic alerts of attacks for the evaluation
of scenario classification and 2) for the definition of reference sce-
narios used during classification. The names and characteristics of
the six attack scenarios are as follows:
1https://secure.dshield.org
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ADistributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack is characterized by
alerts that all share the same destination IP and port. Thus, multiple
attackers target a specific host and service. We can parameterize
this attack by α alerts that are generated on average per attacker.
Attackers use random source ports, which are reused in subsequent
alerts with a probability p. A Scan attack is characterized by alerts
that share the same attacker IP. Random source ports are used to
scan for the same destination port on multiple target machines. On
average α alerts are generated per target and the attacker reuse a
source port with a probability p. A Distributed Scan (D-Scan) is
similar to a Scan attack but with both multiple attackers and targets,
e.g., when a Scan is coordinated by a botnet [5]. Then, tasks for
scanning all targets are split among the attackers. Characteristic for
this scenario is the ratio of attackers to targets, which we denote
as θ . Additionally, targets might be scanned multiple times, i.e.,
from multiple attackers. In this case, α alerts are generated per
target. A Worm attack is characterized by alerts that all share
the same destination port. Additionally, all hosts are attackers and
target randomly µ of other hosts via random source ports. An
Exploration (Expl) attack is characterized by a single attacker that
targets f hosts. Each compromised host serves as source for attacks
on further hosts. Each compromised host targets f new hosts and all
source and target ports are random. The pattern of an Convergence
(Conv) attacker is the opposite of an Exploration attack. The actual
target is attacked by f hosts that themselves are attacked by f
hosts and so on.
For our experiments, we parameterize these six attack patterns
as follows. Per source or target, α = 1.5 alerts are generated. Ports
are reused with a probability p = 50% where appropriate. In case
of lateral movement in a network, it is done with a spread factor
of f = 5, which means that in each step a new compromised
host targets 5 new hosts. If a scenario is characterized by multiple
attackers and targets, their ratio is θ = 0.5, which means the same
amount of attackers and targets. In the case of the worm scenario,
each host attacks µ = 10% of the other hosts.
Attack Variations. In reality not all attacks of the same attack
scenario are equal with respect to their alerts. Of course they differ
in the actual IPs and ports, which, however, are not visible anymore
in the motif signature of the attack. More interesting is the variation
in the attack size. Also, clustered alerts of an attack can contain
false positives which causes variations in the alerts of an attack.
Attack variations of the six scenarios are input to the experiments
in Section 4.2.
We cause attack variations by generating attacks of different size,
i.e., the population ψ , which is the number of hosts involved in
the attack. The attack patterns define how many of the individual
hosts are attackers, targets, or both. For example, in a DDoS attack
of size 100, there would be one target and 99 attackers.
4.1.2 DShield Data Set. We are also using real-world data from
the Internet Storm Center2 that operates DShield, which is a plat-
form for sharing data from security devices, e.g., from firewalls.
The DShield logs consist of alerts from multiple sensors around
the globe. For our real-world experiments, we are using all alerts
2SANS Technology Institute, Internet Storm Center, https://isc.sans.edu
collected on August, 22th in 2016. These are 4,517,497 alerts in total
and are a result of several attacks.
As our approach for scenario classification works on attacks, i.e.,
on alerts of the same attack, we first have to group the DShield alerts
into clusters. For that, we are using the GAC clustering approach [4]
that clusters alerts based on attribute similarity. In contrast to other
clustering approaches, e.g., [7, 17], GAC does not enforce clusters
with static attribute patterns. Instead, it identifies cliques of alerts
that form a community, which allows a high diversity in the alert
clusters and therefore in the attack scenarios. If we would use clus-
tering algorithms with static attribute patterns, alert clustering
would not be able to produce alert clusters for certain attack sce-
narios. Applying GAC clustering with a minimum similarity of
0.25 in between alerts and a clique size of 15 on the DShield data
results in 34,204 clusters. They are the actual input to the real-world
evaluation in Section 4.3.
4.2 Classification of Attack Scenarios
The most important question is if our motif-based classification can
fulfill the requirements to our classification problem (cf. Section 1).
We require the abstraction of attacks to be small and the fingerprint-
ing of attacks to be characteristic for their scenarios. The fulfillment
of the first requirement is given, because the data volume, i.e., size
of all alert data can be magnitudes larger than the size of motif
signatures. Thus, we investigate if a single motif signature is rep-
resentative for all variants of an attack scenario. For that, motif
signatures have to be very similar for attacks of the same attack
scenario. We denote this as intra-class-similarity, which describes
the similarities among attacks from the same attack scenario. In
addition, we also have to look at the inter-class-similarity, which is
the similarity between attacks from different attack scenarios.
4.2.1 Similarities of Scenario Classes. In this experiment, we in-
vestigate the intra-class similarities and inter-class similarities for
attacks of the same size ψ = 100, i.e., number of hosts. For that,
we created 1000 attacks for each of the six scenarios defined in
Section 4.1.1 and measured their similarities. Please note that the
attack patterns themselves inherent some randomness, so that two
attacks of the same scenario differ in their alert data even if they
are of equal size. Apart from different IPs and ports, the relation for
who of the attackers target whom of the victims is chosen differ-
ently every time an attack instance is generated. More randomness
is introduced, because of the generation parameter α = 1.5multiple
alerts are generated for some attackers, which also differs every
time.
Lowest Intra-Class Highest Inter-Class
Similarity [%] Similarity [%] (with)
DDoS 99.64 78.77 (Worm)
Scan 99.29 73.58 (Worm)
D-Scan 88.26 73.42 (Conv)
Worm 89.98 78.77 (DDoS)
Expl 92.65 73.00 (D-Scan)
Conv 91.52 73.42 (D-Scan)
Table 1: Similarities for attacks with 100 hosts for six scenar-
ios, both for the same and for different scenarios.6
Table 1 tells us how different attacks from an individual scenario
might be, i.e., the lowest intra-class similarity. The highest variation
is measured among the D-Scan attacks (lowest similarity of 88.26%)
and the most similar attacks from the same scenario are the DDoS
and Scan attacks, each with a similarity of more than 99%. We
also measured the inter-class-similarities and report the highest
similarities per scenario in Table 1. There are some attack scenarios
that share characteristics. The worm is similar to DDoS and Scan
with 78.77% and 73.58%, respectively. The D-Scan is similar to Expl
and Conv with 73.00% and 73.42%, respectively.
As the lowest intra-class similarity is always higher than the
highest inter-class similarity, motifs are an appropriate abstraction
for alert data to preserve the characteristics of attack scenarios. For
attacks of the same size, the results indicate that our approach can
correctly classify attack scenarios, both in sense of identifying the
correct reference scenarios and detecting scenarios in unsupervised
clustering.
4.2.2 Scaling with Attack Size. Apart from the question if the intra-
class-similarity is always higher than the inter-class-similarity, the
influence of the size of an attack is of interest. This is important
because attacks can greatly differ in their sizes, i.e., number of
hosts ψ . Our motif-based classification is required to detect the
attack scenario for an attack with 100 hosts but also for an attack
with 1000 hosts. For that, we generate attacks for the six attack
scenarios described in Section 4.1.1 with different attack sizes. For
the generated attacks, we calculate the intra-class similarity or
the pairwise inter-class similarity, respectively, depending on if
two attacks are from the same scenario or not. We calculate the
similarities for different sets of attacks. In the set of attacks, we
control the difference between the size of smallest and largest attack,
i.e., how different the attacks are with respect to their size. The
smallest attacks always encompass 100 host and the largest attacks
are of size up to 1000.
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Figure 5: Distance between highest inter-class-similarity
and lowest intra-class-similarity for attacks of several sizes.
The range for attack sizes is [100;ψ ] and the similarities de-
pend on the upper boundψ .In Figure 5, we evaluate the similarities depending on the attack
sizes, i.e., when increasing the range of attack sizes in steps of 100.
On the x-axis is the upper bound of the population sizeψ , meaning
a value on the y-axis depending on a specificψ plots the similarities
among attacks of sizes [100;ψ ] in steps of 100. On the y-axis, we plot
the lowest intra-class-similarity and highest inter-class-similarity
among all attack scenarios. As long as the first curve is above the
second one, it is possible to correctly classify the attacks in our
data set. The gap between both curves indicates the potential range
for the classification parameter τ to achieve correct classifications.
The results indicate that our motif-based approach can preserve
the attack characteristics mostly independent from the attack size.
For attacks of size 100 only, the width of the range for τ is 0.18.
When clustering data sets that contain attacks of sizes between
100 and 1000, the width slowly decreases to 0.13. With respect to
attack sizes between 100 and 1000 and with respect to our six attack
scenarios in this experiment, the average value of τ should be about
0.83 +/- 0.07.
4.2.3 Learning new Scenario Classes. Another question, especially
regarding how to choose τ , is how the accuracy of learning new
scenarios depends on general knowledge of attack scenarios. While
the unsupervised algorithm (cf. Section 3.2.2) can detect and charac-
terize new scenarios, it is a matter of operating the attack clustering
with an appropriate value for τ , not of specific previously defined
reference signatures. For different choices of setting τ , we show
how deriving unknown scenarios performs. In this paper, we define
only six attack scenarios but our approach is not limited to them.
As our attack abstraction enables the identification and comparison
of structural characteristics of attacks, our approach can poten-
tially learn any new scenarios as long as they sufficiently differ in
their communication structure. Another potential goal is to divide
known scenarios into more fine-grained ones, i.e., differentiate a
reflection DDoS from a DDoS performed by a botnet. However, for
simplicity we only define the six general scenarios here and leave
more (fine-grained) scenarios to future work. To still investigate
the learning of new scenarios in this experiment, we assume a
knowledge of only a subset of the six scenarios.
According to the results illustrated in Figure 5, the more τ is
towards the upper bound of the possible range, the definition of
attack scenarios becomes more strict. This results in a higher prob-
ability for false negatives in classifications in case the attacks of a
new scenario have a higher variation than the previously known
ones. However, a high τ also ensures precise classifications by re-
ducing false positives in classifications in case the attacks of a new
scenario share characteristics with a previously known one. If τ is
set towards the lower bound of the range, there is a higher chance
that attacks will be correctly classified although they look different
than expected by the attack scenario. In turn, this increases the
likelihood of false positives.
For this experiment, we use the same data set as in Section
4.2.2, containing attacks from the six scenarios with 100 to 1000
hosts. We then simulate limited knowledge by only considering
the attacks from a subset of scenarios. For each combination of
1 to 6 scenarios, we measure the lowest intra-class and highest
inter-class similarities as in Table 1 and then determine the highest
and lowest possible τ for the attack scenarios as in Figure 5. As
there are multiple possible combinations of scenarios per number
of scenarios, Figure 6 plots the minimum, maximum, and average
value for the true-positive-rate (TRP), false-positive-rate (FPR), and
accuracy of classification. As τ is based on the lowest known intra-
class similarity in Figure 6a, attacks from all remaining scenarios
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Figure 6: Evaluation of attack clustering and classification for attacks of sizes between 100 and 1000. The clustering similarity
τ and the resulting classification metrics depend on the selection of known scenarios as start knowledge.
will definitively go to another class, i.e., we accept a lower TPR
but therefore minimize the FPR for learning new scenarios. In con-
trast, Figure 6b is based on the highest known inter-class similarity,
which maximizes the TPR but accepts a higher FPR in return. Thus,
choosing τ from the higher or lower boundary of possible range
balances the ratio between expected TPR and FPR.
The results here for unsupervised clustering describe the worst-
case performance of attack classification. For signature-based clas-
sification (cf. Section 3.2.1), attacks are only required to be more
similar to the reference signature of their respective scenario than
to the reference signature of a different scenario.
4.3 Real-World Results
After analyzing our scenario classification on artificial data for
which we have the ground truth, we also apply it on the DShield
real-world data (cf. Section 4.1.2) and report the performance of
our motif-based correlation algorithm for the detection of attack
scenarios. As reference scenarios, we use one attack with 100 host
for each of the six attack scenarios in Section 4.1.1. As the results
of Section 4.2 indicate that the similarity threshold should be τ ∈
[0.76; 0.9], we mark the respective range for τ on the x-axis in all
following figures. Choosing τ from this range is a prerequisite to
distinguish attacks from the six reference scenarios.
For this real-world evaluation, we look both at classifying attacks
with the help of reference scenarios and detecting scenarios with
unsupervised clustering to compare them.
4.3.1 Efficiency of Motif Signatures. An efficient data structure
for the abstraction of attacks is necessary when sharing attack
information and process them in a distributed manner [9, 16]. To
evaluate the compression rate of our motif signatures during the
real-world experiments, we measured the total size required at
different stages, i.e., in representation structures, for the 34,204
attacks in the DShield data set:
Alerts with all attributes: 449 MB
Alerts with IP/Port only: 352 MB
Motif signatures of attacks: 5.1 MB
Hence, the size was reduced to 1.12% of the full alert data and
1.43% of the alerts with relevant attributes only.
4.3.2 Signature-based Classification. Wefirst utilize reference-based
clustering to identify attacks that we found in the DShield data set
that can be classified using reference scenarios. If identified, we
assign the attack to one of the six reference scenarios based on
the similarity threshold τ . For the attacks that could not be classi-
fied, we apply unsupervised clustering, which results in additional
classes, i.e., unknown attack scenarios.
Figure 7 shows the performance of the reference-based classifi-
cation depending on τ . Figure 7a in particular illustrates how many
attacks or scenarios have been classified or detected with the help
of reference scenarios. For that, the curve labeled attacks plots the
portion of the 34,204 attacks that have been assigned to one of the
six reference scenarios. For a similarity threshold τ ≤ 0.5, all attacks
are assigned a reference scenario. For larger τ , the attacks have
to match the reference scenarios more closely. It is likely that the
attacks obtained from the DShield data set come with false-positive
alerts. Therefore, these attacks cannot be assigned a reference sce-
nario when close matches with the reference scenarios are required.
Furthermore, the data set can contain attacks that are not covered
by our six reference scenarios and will therefore not match any
of them. In the marked range of τ , however, we were able to clas-
sify at least 76% and up to 96% of the attacks in the DShield data
set. In Figure 7a we investigate the relation between the number
of scenarios detected through reference-based clustering and the
number of scenarios detected through unsupervised clustering of
the remaining attacks. We also plot the portion of the total detected
scenarios which are identified with the help of a reference scenario.
In the marked range of τ , they are between 4% and 26%.
Figure 7b shows the distribution of reference scenarios among
the identified attacks. The portions of the scenarios are stacked,
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Figure 7: Classification of attacks using reference scenarios depending on similarity threshold τ .
so the aggregation of all six scenarios is 100%. As expected from
a real-world data set, the most predominant attack scenarios are
DDoS with in between 60% and 69% as well as Scan with in between
29% and 31%. Although for each of the six reference scenarios there
is at least one attack identified in the marked range of τ , we have to
note that not all reference scenarios can technically show up in the
DShield data set. This is because the destination IP addresses are
hashed and therefore it is not possible to observe attacks in which
an individual host is both, an attacker and a victim. This excludes
the scenarios worm, expl, and conv. Considering this technical
restriction, we conclude that in practice a large similarity threshold
τ ≤ 0.9 should be chosen to avoid an unacceptable amount of false
positive detections.
4.3.3 Unsupervised Clustering. We now evaluate the unsupervised
clustering of the complete DShield real-world data set. For that,
we apply hierarchical clustering (cf. Section 3.2.2) on the DShield
attacks and report the analysis of resulting classes in Figure 8 de-
pending on the similarity threshold τ .
Figure 8a shows the number of detected scenarios for unsuper-
vised clustering on a log-scale. Within the marked range of τ , we
see between 33 and 174 clusters. Defining scenarios by higher sim-
ilarities, i.e., τ , larger than 0.9, rapidly increases the number of
scenarios and should only be used for fine-grained scenarios. We
also count the number of detected scenarios resulting from an unsu-
pervised clustering of attacks that could not be assigned a reference
scenario. We call these detected scenarios remaining in Figure 8a.
The number of detected scenarios indicate that only searching for
our six reference scenarios is not enough. Instead, it is important
to also apply unsupervised clustering at least on attacks for which
no reference scenario can be assigned.
We also compare the results of reference-based and unsuper-
vised clustering. Our motivation is to find out for which value of
the clustering parameter τ we get consistent results. As we have
no ground-truth, we define two metrics to measure the similarity
between the reference clusters Cri ∈ Cr for respective reference
signatures Rri ∈ Rr and the unsupervised clusters Cui ∈ Cu .
The metric Equivalent indicates how close candidates among
the unsupervised clusters Cui ∈ Cu match our reference clusters
Cri ∈ Cr . For that, we find the best candidate cluster Cui for every
reference cluster Cri based on the Jaccard index, i.e., intersection
over union, which is calculated by |C
u
i ∩Cri |
|Cui ∪Cri | . An unsupervised clus-
ter Cui can be matched to at most one reference cluster C
r
i . The
metric represents the average Jaccard metric for the best matches
among all reference clusters Cr .
The metric Homogeneity indicates the average accuracy for
clusters Cui ∈ Cu that include at least one attack identified by the
reference-based classification. In each of these clusters Cui , among
all contained attacks, we measure the fraction of attacks from the
scenario that is present in the cluster most frequently. The met-
ric represents the average homogeneity among all these clusters
weighted by their sizes.
The comparison between signature-based clustering and unsu-
pervised clustering according to the metrics Equivalent and Homo-
geneity is shown in Figure 8b, depending on the similarity threshold
τ . For the marked range of τ , the Homogeneity is between 87% and
97% and the Equivalent is between 56% and 72%. According to the
experiment results of Section 4.3.2, a similarity threshold τ close
to 0.9 seems to be reasonable. Although the highest Homogeneity
is achieved for τ = 0.81, which is in the lower half of the possible
values for τ , the Homogeneity at τ = 0.9 is still at 91%. However, we
note that between 0.81 ≤ τ ≤ 0.9 the metric Homogeneity drops
to 87%. This drop correlates with the changes of the proportions
among the different attack scenarios in Figure 7b. From that per-
spective, τ = 0.9 would be recommended to find attacks for our six
scenario classes.
The two metrics Homogeneity and Equivalent for comparing
signature-based clustering and unsupervised clustering indicate
the following. Clustering attacks from unknown scenarios is done
with high uncertainty. While unsupervised clustering is able to
differentiate between attacks from different scenarios, it will not
be able to perfectly classify a high variability of attacks without
any previous knowledge. Hence, it is a good approach to provide
as much reference scenarios as possible and to use unsupervised
clustering to learn new attack scenarios and to create reference
scenarios in a semi-supervised fashion.
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Figure 8: Identifying scenarios with reference-based and unsupervised classification depending on similarity threshold τ .
5 CONCLUSION
With our motif-based approach, we are able to calculate characteris-
tic signatures of attacks. To achieve that, we process large amounts
of attacks from alerts reported by Intrusion Detection Systems.
Clustered alerts are converted into motif signatures that are an
abstraction over the original attack. These signatures are of small
sizes and thus can be compared very fast. With the help of this
abstraction, we can identify known attack scenarios, detect similar
attacks, and can even learn about new attack scenarios. Our attack
correlation is not limited to central grouping of similar attacks or
to label them with their respective attack scenario. It is also suit-
able for collaborative intrusion detection, where individual sensors
could exchange only the small motif signatures instead of large
amounts of alerts.
Our experiments indicate that the motif-based abstraction is a
suitable representation of attacks to preserve the scenario charac-
teristics, especially for attacks of different sizes. Using six represen-
tative attack scenarios, up to 96% of attacks recorded in a real-world
alert set were successfully classified. Based on both artificial and
real-world experiments, we found the best performance could be
achieved when clustering attacks with a similarity of at least 90%.
Furthermore, we highlighted how we can learn and detect new
attack scenarios when operating our approach adaptively.
For future work we plan to investigate more fine-grained at-
tack scenarios. Also, we plan to use motif-based signatures for the
detection of specific attack scenarios in large unclustered alert sets.
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